Epistemology Group on Rationality
University of Zurich
ZEGRa is a research group based at the University of Zurich in Switzerland and led by Prof. Dr. Anne Meylan, Full Professor of Theoretical Philosophy.
Our research lies at the intersection of epistemology, metaethics and the philosophy of action and is, thereby, intended to bridge divides between theoretical and practical philosophy. Our research group is mainly — but not exclusively — interested in the following kind of questions: what counts as an irrational belief? What makes cognitive irrationality distinct from agentive irrationality (the one that occasionally characterizes our actions)? Is self-deception always reprehensible? What does it mean to believe things responsibly?
Recent Publications
Anne Meylan (forthcoming). If you Ask Yourself a Question, Seek the Answer!. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
Anne Meylan (forthcoming). The Blameworthiness of Fundamentalist Beliefs. In Rik Peels (Ed.). Extreme Beliefs and Responsibility. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Anne Meylan (forthcoming). Withholding Judgement. In Sylvan Kurt, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (Ed.). The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
Anne Meylan & Kevin Reuter (forthcoming). On Being Ignorant. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
Artūrs Logins (forthcoming). Evidence and Emotions: The Problem of Propositional Justification. American Philosophical Quarterly.
Artūrs Logins (forthcoming). Qu’est-ce que le « poids » des raisons si la justification n’admet pas de degrés?. In Jacques Vollet and Jean-Marie Chevalier (Ed.). La notion de degré en épistémologie. Paris: Collège de France.
Artūrs Logins & Jacques Henri Vollet (forthcoming). Putting Knowledge to Work: New Directions for Knowledge-First Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Belkoniene, M. (forthcoming). From Seeing to Knowing: the Case of Propositional Perception. Philosophical Studies.
Claire Field (forthcoming). Being Wrong About Logic. Melis, G., Merlo, G., and Wright, C. (eds.). Self-Knowledge and Knowledge A Priori. Oxford University Press., 1-21.
Claire Field (forthcoming). Embracing Incoherence. N. Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press, 1-29. (external link).
Davide Fassio & Artūrs Logins (forthcoming). Justification and gradability. Philosophical Studies.
Leonardo Flamini (forthcoming). On instrumental zetetic normativity. Philosophical Topics. (external link).
Leonardo Flamini (forthcoming). On Interrogative Inquiries Without Suspended Judgement and Doxastic Neutrality. Dialogue. (external link).
Marie van Loon, Sebastian Schmidt & Anne Meylan (eds.) (forthcoming). Beyond Evidence in Epistemology. special issue of Philosophical Topis.
Schmidt, S. (forthcoming). The Ethics of Belief in a Burning World. Australasian Philosophical Review. (external link).
Schmidt, S. (forthcoming). Should We Respond Correctly to Our Reasons?. Episteme. (external link).
Anne Meylan & Thomas Raleigh (2025). Normative relations between ignorance and suspension of judgement: a systematic investigation. In Verena Wagner & Alexandra Zinkke (Ed.). Doxastic Suspension. New York, Routledge.
Belak, A. (2025). Trust Coherently. Ein Kommentar zu Trust Responsibly. Non-Evidential Virtue Epistemology. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 79, 106-109. (external link).
Belkoniene, M. (2025). Moral understanding: From virtue to knowledge. Noûs, 59, 219-233.
Guilielmo, Benoit (2025). Doubt and suspension: Two attitudes or one?. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia, 39, 315-331. (external link).