Epistemology Group on Rationality

University of Zurich

ZEGRa is a research group based at the University of Zurich in Switzerland and led by Prof. Dr. Anne Meylan, Assistant Professor of Theoretical Philosophy (Tenure-Track).

Our research lies at the intersection of epistemology, metaethics and the philosophy of action and is, thereby, intended to bridge divides between theoretical and practical philosophy. Our research group is mainly — but not exclusively — interested in the following kind of questions: what counts as an irrational belief? What makes cognitive irrationality distinct from agentive irrationality (the one that occasionally characterizes our actions)? Is self-deception always reprehensible? What does it mean to believe things responsibly?

Recent Publications

Anne Meylan (forthcoming). In Defence of the Normative Account of Ignorance. Erkenntnis.

Artūrs Logins (forthcoming). Evidence and Emotions: The Problem of Propositional Justification. American Philosophical Quarterly.

Artūrs Logins (forthcoming). Qu’est-ce que le « poids » des raisons si la justification n’admet pas de degrés?. In Jacques Vollet and Jean-Marie Chevalier (Ed.). La notion de degré en épistémologie. Paris: Collège de France.

Artūrs Logins & Jacques Henri Vollet (forthcoming). Putting Knowledge to Work: New Directions for Knowledge-First Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Belkoniene, M. (forthcoming). Rational Understanding: From Explanation to Knowledge. Routledge.

Belkoniene, M. (forthcoming). Grasping in Understanding. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

Belkoniene, M. (forthcoming). Reassessing Lucky Understanding. Episteme.

Belkoniene, M. (forthcoming). Confusion, Understanding and Success. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.

Benoit Guilielmo (forthcoming). Inquiry, Questions, and Actions. Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review. (external link).

Claire Field (forthcoming). Being Wrong About Logic. Melis, G., Merlo, G., and Wright, C. (eds.). Self-Knowledge and Knowledge A Priori. Oxford University Press., 1-21.

Claire Field (forthcoming). Embracing Incoherence. N. Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press, 1-29. (external link).

Davide Fassio & Artūrs Logins (forthcoming). Justification and gradability. Philosophical Studies.

Kiesel, D., Schmidt, S., and Smettan, T. (forthcoming). Altruismus. Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven. Metzler.

Meylan, A., Schmidt, S., and van Loon, M. (forthcoming). Beyond Evidence in Epistemology. Special Issue of Philosophical Topics.

Schmidt, S. (forthcoming). Responsibility for Rationality: Foundations of an Ethics of Mind. Routledge. (external link).

Schmidt, S. (forthcoming). The Ethics of Belief in a Burning World. Australasian Philosophical Review. (external link).

Schmidt, S. (forthcoming). Doxastic Dilemmas and Epistemic Blame. Philosophical Issues, 34. (external link).

Claire Field (2024). Rational belief, epistemic possibility, and the a priori. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 3, 1-9. (external link).

Schmidt, S. (2024). Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence. Erkenntnis, 89, 1-24. (external link).

Artūrs Logins (2023). The Paradox of Graded Justification. Episteme.

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