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From 2018
Assistant-professor with tenure-track, chair of theoretical philosophy, University of Zurich.

Swiss National Foundation (SNF) Professor (assistant-professor, 4 years position), University of Basel, head of the SNF research project “Cognitive Irrationality”.

Visiting lecturer, chair of history of philosophy (replacement of Prof. Schulthess), University of Neuchâtel.

Spring 15
Visiting lecturer, chair of theoretical philosophy (replacement of Prof. Glock), University of Zurich.

Spring 14
Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of Toronto.

“Maître-assistante”, on SNF funded project: Epistemic Emotions: Nature and Role, University of Geneva, 50%.

Lecturer associated with the chair of philosophy of language, mind and human sciences, University of Fribourg, 50%.

2009- 2013
“Maître-assistante”, on SNF funded project: Perception, Warrant and a Priori Knowledge, University of Geneva.

Spring 2011
Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Epistemology Research Group, University of Lund.

Autumn 2009
Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Social Epistemology Research Group, University of Copenhagen.

PhD student, University of Edinburgh.

PhD student on SNF funded project: Knowledge, Reasons, and Norms, University of Geneva.

PhD student and junior lecturer, associated with the chair of history of philosophy, University of Neuchâtel.

Domains of specialization/competence
AOS: Epistemology, metaethics.
AOC: Value theory, philosophy of the emotions, philosophy of psychiatry.

University of Zürich

Anne Meylan (2015). Qu’est-ce que la justification?. Paris: Vrin.
Anne Meylan (2013). Foundations of an Ethics of Belief. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Anne Meylan (forthcoming). In Defence of the Normative Account of Ignorance. Erkenntnis.
Anne Meylan (2022). Doxastic Justification and Creditworthiness. In L. Oliveira & P. Silva (Ed.). Propositional and Doxastic Justification. New Essays on Their Nature and Significance. New York: Routledge, 121 - 130.
Anne Meylan (2021). Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 103 (1), 199 - 216.
Anne Meylan (2021). Radical Scepticism, Stereotypes and the Pragmatist Stance. In Luca Moretti and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (Ed.). Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill, 197 - 210.
Anne Meylan (2020). Ignorance and its disvalue. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 97 (3), 433 - 447.
Anne Meylan (2020). The Normative Ground of the Evidential Ought. In Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford (Ed.). Epistemic Duties. New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge, 208 - 217.
Anne Meylan (2019). The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Doxastic Responsibility and the Basing Relation. Erkenntnis, 84 (4), 877 - 893.
Anne Meylan (2018). Assessing self-deception: Butler, Clifford, and contemporary philosophy. Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger, 143 (3), 357 - 370.