My research focusses on the epistemology of normative beliefs - beliefs about what is rationally permissible, or morally required.
I also have research interests in rational risk-taking, rational incoherence, and neurodiversity.
PhD University of St Andrews (2020)
Postdoctoral Positions:
Roots of Responsibility ERC Project, UCL (2019 - 2020)
Varieties of Risk AHRC Project, University of Stirling (2020-2022)
COGITO, University of Glasgow (2022 - 2023)
University of Zürich
Claire Field (forthcoming). Being Wrong About Logic. Melis, G., Merlo, G., and Wright, C. (eds.). Self-Knowledge and Knowledge A Priori. Oxford University Press., 1-21.
Claire Field (forthcoming). Embracing Incoherence. N. Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press, 1-29. (external link).
Claire Field (2024). Rational belief, epistemic possibility, and the a priori. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 3, 1-9. (external link).
Claire Field (2022). At Least You Tried: the Value of De Dicto Concern to Do the Right Thing. Philosophical Studies, 179, 2707–2730. (external link).
Claire Field (2022). Review of Julia Staffel, Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality. Mind, 131, 724-733.
Claire Field, Bruno Jacinto (2022). Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms. Erkenntnis, 1-53. (external link).
Claire Field (2021). Giving Up the Enkratic Principle. Logos & Episteme, 12, 7-28. (external link).
Claire Field (2021). Moral Appraisal for Everyone: Neurodiversity, Epistemic Limitations, and Responding to the Right Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 24, 733-752. (external link).
Claire Field (2020). Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality. Acta Analytica, 36, 423-441. (external link).
Claire Field (2020). Review of Brian Weatherson, Normative Externalism. Philosophy, 95, 391-394.
Calire Field (2019). Recklessness and Uncertainty: Jackson Cases and Merely Apparent Asymmetry. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 16, 391-413. (external link).
Claire Field (2019). It’s OK to Make Mistakes: Against the Fixed Point Thesis. Episteme, 16, 175-185. (external link).
Claire Field (2019). Review of Susanne Mantel, Determined by Reasons: A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason. Ethics, 129, 484-489.