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Areas of Specialization: Epistemology, Metaethics

12/2020 – present
Postdoctoral Researcher
University of Zurich

09/2021– present
Research Associate at the African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science (ACEPS)
University of Johannesburg; Visit: 02-03/2022

09/2022-08/2023
SNSF Postdoc Mobility Fellow; Project: "Towards a Relationship-Based Epistemology"
University of Southern California & University of Glasgow

​10/2015 – 11/2020
Ph.D. in Philosophy; Dissertation: The Problem of Mental Responsibility (summa cum laude)
FAU Erlangen-Nuremberg; funded by German Academic Foundation (Studienstiftung)

04/2019 – 11/2020
Research Assistant (Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter & Assistent)
FAU Erlangen-Nuremberg & Universität Zürich

2015 – 2019
Visiting Graduate Student
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), City University of New York (CUNY), University of Reading

04/2011 – 09/2015
M.A. in Philosophy, B.A. in Philosophy and German Studies
FAU-Erlangen-Nuremberg

University of Zurich

Kiesel, D., Schmidt, S., and Smettan, T. (forthcoming). Altruismus. Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven. Metzler.
Meylan, A., Schmidt, S., and van Loon, M. (forthcoming). Beyond Evidence in Epistemology. Special Issue of Philosophical Topics.
Schmidt, S. (forthcoming). Responsibility for Rationality: Foundations of an Ethics of Mind. Routledge. (external link).
Schmidt, S. and Ernst, G. (2020). The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity. Routledge. (external link).
Schmidt, S. (forthcoming). The Ethics of Belief in a Burning World. Australasian Philosophical Review. (external link).
Schmidt, S. (forthcoming). Doxastic Dilemmas and Epistemic Blame. Philosophical Issues, 34. (external link).
Schmidt, S. (2024). Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence. Erkenntnis, 89, 1-24. (external link).
Meylan, A. and Schmidt, S. (2023). Refusing the COVID-19 vaccine: what’s wrong with that?. Philosophical Psychology, 36, 1102-1124. (external link).
Schmidt, S. (2023). Incoherence and the Balance of Evidential Reasons. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2 (50), 1-10. (external link).
Schmidt, S. (2022). On Believing Indirectly for Practical Reasons. Philosophical Studies, 179, 1795-1819. (external link).
Schmidt, S. (2022). Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Online First. (external link).
Schmidt, S. (2021). Wie vernünftig sind Verschwörungstheoretiker? Corona und intellektuelles Vertrauen. In Jaster, R. and Keil, G. (Ed.). Nachdenken über Corona. Philosophische Essays über die Pandemie und ihre Folgen. Reclam, 98-109. .
Schmidt, S. (2020). Responsibility for Attitudes, Object-Given Reasons, and Blame. In Schmidt, S. and Ernst, G. (Ed.). The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity. Routledge, 149-175. .
Schmidt, S. (2016). Können wir uns entscheiden, etwas zu glauben? Zur Möglichkeit und Unmöglichkeit eines doxastischen Willens. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 93, 571-582. (external link).
Schmidt, S. (2015). Wittgensteins Antirelativismus in Über Gewissheit. In Kanzian, C., Mitterer, J., and Neges, K. (Ed.). Realismus – Relativismus – Konstruktivismus. Beiträge des 38. Internationalen Wittgenstein Symposiums. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 268-270. .